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Abstract
We investigate empirically whether a central bank can promote ﬁnancial stability by sta-
bilizing inﬂation and output, and whether additional stabilization of asset prices and credit
growth would enhance ﬁnancial stability in particular. We employ an econometric model of
the Norwegian economy to investigate the performance of simple interest rate rules that allow
a response to asset prices and credit growth, in addition to inﬂation and output. We ﬁnd
that output stabilization tends to improve ﬁnancial stability. Additional stabilization of house
prices, equity prices and/or credit growth enhances stability in both inﬂation and output, but
has mixed eﬀects on ﬁnancial stability. In general, ﬁnancial stability as measured by e.g. asset
price volatility improves, while ﬁnancial stability measured by indicators that depend directly
on interest rates deteriorates, mainly because of higher interest rate volatility owing to a more
active monetary policy.
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11 Introduction
Inﬂation-targeting central banks are generally entrusted with the responsibility of promoting a
stable ﬁnancial system as well. A stable ﬁnancial system facilitates a regular and eﬃcient alloca-
tion of funds between savers and borrowers and diversiﬁcation of risk. It is therefore conducive to
long-term economic growth, stable movements in prices and output and an eﬀective monetary pol-
icy. The detrimental eﬀects of ﬁnancial instability on the macroeconomy are widely acknowledged.
Fisher (1933) ascribed the great depression (1929–1933) mainly to over-indebtedness and the re-
sulting deﬂation due to distress selling of assets. A more recent example of such a debt-deﬂation
phenomenon is the Japanese experience; see e.g. Mishkin (2005) and the references therein. In
Norway, and the other Scandinavian countries, high credit growth and booms and busts in the real
estate markets contributed to severe banking crises and recessions especially in the early 1990s;
see e.g. Hoggarth et al. (2002) and Grung-Moe et al. (2004).
We investigate empirically to what extent a ﬂexible inﬂation-targeting central bank can promote
ﬁnancial stability by stabilizing inﬂation and real output, or as a special case, nominal income;
cf. McCallum and Nelson (1999). A ﬂexible inﬂation-targeting central bank typically incorporates
a concern for output stability when targeting inﬂation; cf. Svensson (1999). We particularly
investigate whether there are gains in terms of ﬁnancial stability, as well as in terms of inﬂation
and output stability, by additionally stabilizing variables that are commonly linked to ﬁnancial
(in)stability, such as asset prices and credit growth; see e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002).
In the relevant literature, there is as yet no consensus as to whether inﬂation targeting alone
or in combination with output stabilization will ensure ﬁnancial stability in the normal course
of monetary policy making; see e.g. Cecchetti et al. (2000), Bordo and Jeanne (2002), Roubini
(2006), Posen (2006) and the references therein. A common argument is that stable inﬂation is
conducive to a regular and eﬃcient ﬂow of funds between savers and borrowers since undue real
wealth transfers between them, owing to inﬂation or deﬂation, can be largely avoided. In addition,
prices can better guide consumption and investment and thereby help avoid over-investment and
possible failures to service accrued debt. Stabilization of inﬂation also helps checking possible
deﬂationary eﬀects of distress selling of assets to pay oﬀ debt; cf. Fisher (1933) and Mishkin
(2005). By additionally stabilizing output one can better maintain the debt-servicing capacity
of borrowers and thereby avoid debt liquidation. A stable nominal income could be especially
eﬀective in maintaining the debt-servicing capacity of borrowers when nominal wages are sticky;
cf. Bean (1983).
However, it has been argued that monetary policy may fail to deal timely and eﬀectively with
potential future economic instability implied by unchecked growth in credit and asset prices by
just focusing on prices and/or output; see e.g. Cecchetti et al. (2000), Bordo and Jeanne (2002)
2and Borio and Lowe (2002). It has been pointed out that excessive debt accumulation and over-
investment usually occurs in periods of a boom in asset prices because of their collateral eﬀects
on borrowing and lending; cf. Bernanke et al. (1999). Debt liquidation due to failures to service
accrued debt or erosion of collateral values owing to asset price busts can lead to a credit crunch,
business failures, unemployment and deﬂation. Furthermore, stabilization of inﬂation and output
may not be suﬃcient to induce a stable growth in asset prices and credit, and thereby a stable
ﬁnancial sector and real economy, because asset prices are often more or less disconnected from their
fundamentals. This may also contribute to disconnecting credit from its sustainable value because
asset prices aﬀect collateral values. Such behavior of asset prices and credit may therefore fuel
unsustainable growth in consumption and investment and thereby contribute to macroeconomic
instability, including ﬁnancial fragility.
Accordingly, monetary policy can become more eﬀective in reaching its macroeconomic objec-
tives, including ﬁnancial stability, by stabilizing asset prices and/or credit, in addition to inﬂation
and output. The case for a monetary policy response to misalignments in asset prices such as real
estate and equity prices has been made by e.g. Cecchetti et al. (2000), Borio and Lowe (2002) and
Filardo (2004) and investigated by e.g. Filardo (2000) and Chadha et al. (2004). A response to
misalignments in exchange rates is discussed in inter alia Ball (1999b).
Apparently, a tightening (easing) of monetary policy when asset prices rise above (below)
sustainable levels may help to smooth ﬂuctuations in credit growth, output and inﬂation. Such
moves may also reduce the possibility of large asset price misalignments arising in the ﬁrst place.
On the other hand, asset prices are quite volatile and sustainable values of asset prices are hard
to identify. The end result could therefore be an overactive monetary policy that may prove
to destabilize the economy in general. Moreover, a misjudgment of the sustainable values can
alternatively lead to an overly stable economy at the expense of eﬃcient resource allocation.
Responding directly to credit growth is another option. It is possible that stable credit growth
can contribute to reining in movements in asset prices as well as consumption and investment and
thereby promote economic stability in general, and ﬁnancial stability in particular. Experience
from money growth targeting in some countries, including that of the USA in the early 1980s,
is not encouraging, however. Accordingly, stabilization of credit growth can also induce excess
volatility in interest rates, which may have a destabilizing eﬀect on the real economy and the
ﬁnancial system. Yet, it is possible that the stabilization eﬀect of asset prices and credit growth on
inﬂation and output is of such magnitude that interest rates ultimately become more stable. An
empirical investigation can shed light on the merits of responding directly to asset prices and/or
credit growth in addition to inﬂation and output.
We investigate the performance of a large number of simple interest rate rules within the context
of a well speciﬁed econometric model of a small economy, Norway, where exchange rates tend to
3play a more important role than in large economies. The model links credit growth and three
classes of asset prices, i.e. house prices, equity prices and the nominal exchange rate, and the rest
of the economy through several channels. The model is therefore well suited for evaluating the
performance of Taylor-type interest rate rules augmented with asset prices and/or credit growth;
see e.g. Taylor (1999). The model used is largely an extension of the model in B˚ ardsen and
Nymoen (2001) and B˚ ardsen et al. (2003), and is presented in detail in an earlier version of this
paper: Akram and Eitrheim (2006).1
In the next section we point out some key properties and mechanisms in the econometric
model. We also present a stylized version of the model, to easily highlight the role of asset prices
and credit growth in the model. Section 3 presents the objective function of a central bank under a
ﬂexible inﬂation-targeting regime, discusses several operational indicators of ﬁnancial (in)stability
and presents a general version of a simple interest rate rule that encompasses all of the rules
evaluated, including non-linear versions of the simple rules. This section also sheds light on the
key properties of the rules and mechanisms that come into play when the policy rate responds to
movements in asset prices and credit. Section 4 presents our main analysis and the outcomes of
sensitivity analyses, which support our main ﬁndings. Section 5 oﬀers our main conclusions, while
the appendix presents details about relevant variables and model simulations.
2 The model in a stylized form
The model pertains to the Norwegian mainland economy, i.e. exclusive of its petroleum sector. It
explicitly takes into account several channels of interplay between asset prices, credit, output and
inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, the model includes equations of house prices, domestic equity prices, the
nominal exchange rate, credit demand, aggregate demand, unemployment, wages and domestic
consumer prices. Monetary policy represented by short-term nominal interest rates has direct
eﬀects on the three asset prices including the nominal exchange rate, credit and aggregate demand,
but it is neutral in the long run. The model may be considered a backward-looking model in the
sense that the expectations formation process is not explicitly modeled.
The model is (log) linear and its equations are in error-correction form. They have been speciﬁed
and estimated on samples of quarterly aggregate data from the period 1970–2001. The model is
econometrically well speciﬁed, with apparently invariant parameters with respect to changes in
monetary policy over the sample; its statistical properties are documented in Akram and Eitrheim
(2006). The model characterizes a stable (economic) system where eﬀects of transitory shocks
eventually die out. A linear stable model may be considered appropriate for shedding light on the
merits of incorporating concern for ﬁnancial stability, considered as an observable state of aﬀairs, in
1Available from http://www.norges-bank.no/upload/import/publikasjoner/arbeidsnotater/pdf/arb-2006-07.pdf
4the normal course of monetary policy making than in situations of crises or near-crises. Non-linear
models are required to model the latter situations.2
To highlight the transmission mechanism of asset prices in the Norwegian economy, we present
a stylized version of the model used in equations (1)–(8), obtained by following the approach of
B˚ ardsen (2005). Here, eﬀects of exogenous variables such as foreign output, interest rates, oil
prices and government expenditures have been suppressed. Our results, however, are based on the
complete model, as presented in Akram and Eitrheim (2006), with its rich dynamics and embedded
attention to institutional and structural changes in the Norwegian economy since the 1970s.
Below, all variables except nominal interest rates (r) are in natural logarithms. ∆ denotes the
ﬁrst diﬀerence operator, and foreign variables are denoted by starred superscripts. The nominal
eﬀective exchange rate (in logs denoted e) expresses the number of domestic currency units per
unit of foreign currency, while q ≡ (e + p∗ − p) denotes the log level of the real exchange rate. `
represents (log of) nominal credit demand, while pr denotes labor productivity; see the appendix
for precise deﬁnitions of the variables.
Aggregate demand: ∆yt = 0.02∆(s − p)t + 0.3∆qt (1)
− 0.2[y + (r − ∆4p) − 0.5q − 0.1(ph − p)]t−1,
Real credit: ∆(` − p)t = 0.1∆yt + 0.05∆(ph − p)t + 0.01∆(s − p)t (2)
− 0.05[(` − p) − 0.5y + 3r − (ph − p)]t−1 ,
House prices: ∆pht = 1.1∆pt + 0.05∆st + 0.2∆yt + 1.0∆(` − p)t − 1.4∆rt (3)
− 0.1[(ph − p) − 0.5y − 0.25(` − p) + 4(r − ∆p)]t−1 ,
Equity prices: (∆s − r)t = 0.9(∆s∗ − r)t − 5∆rt , (4)
Exchange rate: ∆et = −0.5∆rt − 0.1(r − r∗)t − 0.1[e − (p − p∗)]t−1 , (5)
Unemployment: ∆ut = −0.1ut−1 − 2.8∆yt, (6)
Wages: ∆wt = 0.7∆pt − 0.1[w − p − pr + 0.1u]t−1, (7)
Consumer prices: ∆pt = 0.4∆wt + 0.05∆yt − 0.06[p − 0.7(w − pr) − 0.3(e + p∗)]t−1 . (8)
Aggregate demand (yt) is characterized in equation (1). Equity prices and house prices, in
particular, have wealth eﬀects on aggregate demand; cf. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In addition,
aggregate demand is aﬀected by the real interest rate (r − ∆4p) and the real exchange rate q.
Thus, a change in the nominal exchange rate would also directly aﬀect aggregate demand.3
2Another argument for using non-linear models becomes relevant if one considers ﬁnancial stability as a property
of a system rather than a state of aﬀairs; see Allen and Wood (2006). Accordingly, a stable linear model would be
considered unsuitable for studying ﬁnancial stability in this case, since ﬁnancial instability would be ruled out a
priori by model design.
3We have not found any signiﬁcant direct eﬀect of oil prices on aggregate demand (of the mainland economy).
5Equity prices and house prices have collateral eﬀects on (real) credit demand; see equation (2).
Credit demand also depends on income (represented by actual output (yt)) and interest rates, as
in a standard money-demand equation.
House prices in real terms are mainly determined by income, interest rates and credit; see
equation (3). Equity prices have also some short-run eﬀects on house prices. Credit aﬀects the
economy through its eﬀects on house prices.
Nominal equity prices are modeled in light of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by
treating the Norwegian stock market portfolio as a “single”asset and the international stock market
portfolio as the “market portfolio”. The relationship obtained in equation (4) suggests that excess
returns on the Norwegian stock market portfolio (∆s − r)t move closely with excess returns on the
international market portfolio. There is a strong negative relationship between changes in interest
rates and excess returns on the domestic stock market. In addition, an increase in oil prices (here
suppressed) has a positive eﬀect on equity prices, and thereby on aggregate demand, credit growth
and house prices; see equations (1)–(3).
The nominal exchange rate appreciates when the interest rate and/or the interest rate diﬀer-
ential increases, ceteris paribus; see equation (5). It also reacts to correct deviations from PPP
and thereby contributes to stabilizing the real exchange rate; see Akram (2006). Also, a rise in oil
prices (here suppressed) tend to appreciate the nominal exchange rate in the short run. In the long
run, the nominal exchange rate reﬂects the diﬀerence between domestic and foreign prices and any
diﬀerence between domestic and foreign interest rates. Accordingly, domestic inﬂation becomes
fully reﬂected in the nominal exchange rate in the long run.
The unemployment rate ut follows output growth in the short run, as in an Okun’s law rela-
tionship; see equation (6). In addition, it reverts slowly towards its equilibrium rate, which also
depends on an intercept term (here suppressed).
There is a partial pass-through of consumer price inﬂation to nominal wage growth (∆w) in
the short run; see equation (7). In each period, nominal wages adjust towards their long-run
relationship where there is a full pass-through of consumer prices and productivity. However, the
mark-up of wages on prices and productivity falls with the unemployment rate.4
In the short run, consumer price inﬂation varies with changes in aggregate demand and to
some extent nominal wage growth; see equation (8). In addition, it adjusts to correct deviations
from the long-run relationship for consumer prices. In the long run, consumer prices reﬂect a
weighted average of domestic and imported costs, represented by unit labor costs and import
However, oil prices indirectly aﬀect aggregate demand through their positive eﬀects on equity prices and the nominal
exchange rate; see the complete equations in Akram and Eitrheim (2006). One reason for the absence of direct oil
price eﬀects could be that the eﬀects of oil prices are already taken into account by the government consumption
variable, which is exogenous (and hence is suppressed in equation (1), but appear explicitly in the detailed doc-
umentation of the model in Akram and Eitrheim (2006)). Norwegian oil revenues are invested abroad while the
return on the petroleum assets abroad is used by the government in accordance with a ﬁscal policy rule.
4The constant mark-up term is suppressed. In the full econometric model, productivity pr is also an endogenous
variable that depends on real wages w − p, unemployment u and a deterministic trend.
6prices. The model also includes an equation for the underlying inﬂation rate (∆4pu), which is
linked to consumer price inﬂation.
Impulse response of key variables to shocks in asset prices (equity prices, house prices and the
nominal exchange rate) and short-term interest rates are helpful in understanding the results to
be presented. The impulse responses (based on the complete model) reveal the following overall
eﬀects of shocks to asset prices, credit growth and short-term interest rates. First, a shock to the
nominal exchange rate has stronger and more immediate eﬀects on inﬂation and output growth
than shocks to house prices and equity prices. This is partly because the nominal exchange directly
aﬀects inﬂation and aggregate demand. The initial eﬀect of a nominal exchange rate on aggregate
demand becomes modiﬁed over time, however, due to the exchange rate pass-through to inﬂation,
whose eﬀect is opposite to that of the nominal exchange rate on the real exchange rate. House
prices and equity prices aﬀect aggregate demand and (through that) domestic inﬂation with some
lags. Second, house prices tend to have relatively stronger eﬀects on credit growth than the
nominal exchange rate and equity prices. And third, a shock to interest rates directly aﬀects the
asset prices, credit and aggregate demand. Asset prices respond more strongly than credit and
aggregate demand to changes in interest rates.
3 Monetary policy objectives and interest rate rules
The following version of a standard quadratic loss function can be used to represent monetary
policy objectives under strict and ﬂexible inﬂation-targeting regimes:
L(λ,φ) = V (e π) + λV (e y) + φV (f), (9)
where V (e π) denotes the variance of price inﬂation relative to a ﬁxed inﬂation target, e π, V (e y)
denotes the variance of output relative to an equilibrium path, e y; while V (f) is a variance term
representing ﬁnancial instability. The parameters λ and φ are the weights the monetary policy
authority attaches to output and ﬁnancial instability, respectively. The loss function under a
ﬂexible inﬂation-targeting regime with a preference for output and ﬁnancial stability can be deﬁned
by λ > 0 and φ > 0, while a strict inﬂation-targeting regime can be deﬁned by λ = φ = 0; cf.
Svensson (1999).
The issue of interest for this study is whether an inﬂation-targeting central bank with a pref-
erence for output and ﬁnancial stability can obtain a better performance by responding to excess
movements in asset prices and/or credit than by just responding to excess ﬂuctuations in inﬂation
and output. Moreover, whether it can by additionally responding to asset prices or credit increase
stability in inﬂation and output, even when ﬁnancial stability is not its concern, i.e. φ = 0.
73.1 Financial stability
We employ several indicators of ﬁnancial stability since there does not seem to exist a widely
accepted deﬁnition and (hence) indicator of ﬁnancial stability; see e.g. Allen and Wood (2006) for
a discussion. Nevertheless, ﬁnancial instability is commonly associated with periods of booms and
busts in asset prices and credit; see e.g. Borio (2005) and the references therein.
Booms and busts in asset prices can be represented by the (empirical) variances of asset prices
which can be used as indicators of the state of ﬁnancial stability. A low variance of asset prices
can indicate that they are ﬂuctuating largely in line with their sustainable values, while a high
variance can signal that they are frequently misaligned relative to their sustainable values. A
positive weight on the variance measure in the loss function also implies that the monetary policy
authority wants to avoid positive as well as negative misalignments. One may therefore let the
variable f be a function of asset prices. It is also common to use variance of (changes in) interest
rates as an indicator of ﬁnancial stability, partly because volatility in interest rates is among the
main determinants of volatility in asset prices.
However, one may argue that ﬁnancial instability is generally associated with ﬂuctuations in
several ﬁnancial and real economic variables rather than in just asset prices. The state of ﬁnancial
stability may therefore be diﬃcult to assess by merely focusing on a single or a limited set of either
ﬁnancial or real economic variables. Below, we consider such broad indicators.
Consequences of booms and busts in asset prices for ﬁnancial stability may depend on the
debt burden of borrowers relative to their carrying capacity. A stable debt burden relative to the
carrying capacity therefore seems conducive to ﬁnancial stability. This motivates use of measures
such as the debt to income ratio: f = L/PY , where L is the level of nominal credit, while PY
deﬁnes nominal income; P is the consumer price index, since the GDP deﬂator is not modeled.
In the medium run, however, defaults on loans to households and ﬁrms are usually associated
with their inability to service their debt rather than to the debt level itself. This suggests deﬁning
f as the debt service to income ratio: f = rLL/PY , where rL is the nominal lending interest rate,
which is a function of the short-term interest rate (r) in the model.
We also deﬁne f as the broader ﬁnancial fragility indicator employed by Eitrheim and Gul-
brandsen (2001).5 This indicator depends on a number of variables that are commonly considered
to be of direct relevance to ﬁnancial stability. These are the debt service ratio, real interest rate,
the unemployment rate and the real values of the three asset prices: house prices, equity prices and
the nominal exchange rate. These variables are able to explain a substantial fraction of accrued
losses in the Norwegian ﬁnancial sector (mainly banks); see Eitrheim and Gulbrandsen (2001).
Finally, we consider a version of this indicator net of direct interest rate eﬀects since interest rate
ﬂuctuations themselves need not harm ﬁnancial stability if the other ﬁnancial and real economic
5See http://www.bis.org/publ/bispap01o.pdf, p. 321 for details.
8variables remain stable, partly because of movements in interest rates.
3.2 Simple interest rate rules
We characterize monetary policy by diﬀerent simple interest rate rules and evaluate their per-
formance within the econometric model in terms of standard deviations of the excess inﬂation,
output growth and the ﬁnancial stability indicators; cf. Taylor (1999) and the references therein.
We consider linear as well as non-linear simple interest rate rules. These rules can be obtained as
special cases of the following general interest rate rule:
rt = (¯ π + rr) + ωπ(∆4put − ¯ π) + ωy(∆4yt − µy)
+ ωr(rt−1 − (¯ π + rr))
+ ωe,t(et − (p − pf)t) + ωph,t(∆4pht − µph) + ωs,t(∆4st − µs)
+ ω`,t(∆4`t − µ`). (10)
Here, ¯ π represents the (constant) inﬂation target while rr represents an equilibrium real interest
rate. Their sum, (¯ π + rr), deﬁnes the neutral nominal interest rate. The µs represent steady
values of the growth terms which are assumed to be constant. The ωs denote constant or time
varying response coeﬃcients associated with the diﬀerent terms in the rule; subscript t indicates
time variation.
The interest rate rule is speciﬁed mostly in terms of growth gaps. Such a speciﬁcation turned
out to improve on results obtained by using deviations from equilibrium paths, deﬁned by the
error-correction terms in the model, except for the nominal exchange rate term. In the latter case,
interest rates respond to the deviation between the nominal exchange rate and its equilibrium path,
i.e. the diﬀerence between domestic and foreign prices in line with the PPP hypothesis. Also, the
terms entering the rule are assumed to be contemporaneous with the interest rate changes, for
simplicity. A forward- or backdating of the terms did not change our conclusions.6
The ﬁrst two lines in the rule specify a Taylor-type rule, hereafter Taylor rule, without and
with interest rate smoothing, respectively; see e.g. Taylor (1999) and the contributions therein.
Here, the inﬂation gap is speciﬁed in terms of the underlying annual inﬂation rate (∆4put), in
line with the monetary policy in Norway. The rule includes output growth, instead of the output
gap, since it provides a better ﬁt with the actual policy than the output gap over the simulation
period.7 Moreover, output growth usually undergoes smaller data revisions than the output gap.
6Our conclusions are also robust to the following alternative speciﬁcation of the linear interest rate rule: rt =
ωr(rt−1 −(¯ π+rr))+(1−ωr)[(¯ π+rr)+ωπ(∆4put − ¯ π)+ωy(∆4yt −µy)+ωe(et −(p−p∗)t)+ωph(∆4pht −µph)+
ωs(∆4st − µs) + ω`(∆4`t − µ`)].
7Bernhardsen and B˚ ardsen (2004) show that such an output growth rule oﬀers a better ﬁt with the actual interest
rate setting than an output gap rule. The estimated weight on output growth was found to be 0.6 in this study,
9The third line in the rule speciﬁes the response to excess ﬂuctuations in the three asset prices,
while the fourth line speciﬁes the response to excess credit growth.
The steady-state values for the arguments in the interest rate rule are determined mostly in
light of their historical values; see Table 1 for details. The exceptions are the target rate for the
underlying annual inﬂation rate, ¯ π, which is set equal to the oﬃcial target of 2.5% per annum and
the equilibrium value for the real interest rate, rr, which is set at 3.5.
The simple interest rate rule (10) is linear when the response coeﬃcients associated with asset
prices and credit terms are (also) constant, i.e. ωa,t = ωa, where a = e, ph,s and `. In the linear
rule, the policy interest rate responds symmetrically to misalignments in asset prices and credit.
Raising interest rates when asset prices and credit rise above their sustainable values can be seen as
a preemptive act to avoid a potential bust later. That is, one counteracts booms to avoid potential
busts. A response to asset prices and credit when they fall below their equilibrium values can be
seen as a cure aimed at counteracting their fall or the eﬀects of it.
We also consider non-linear simple interest rate rules where the interest rate response to mis-
alignments increases with the size of a perceived misalignment. Such a size-dependent response
can be motivated by uncertainty and heterogeneity of beliefs among economic agents regarding the
equilibrium paths of asset prices and credit. Particularly large deviations of asset prices and credit
from their estimated equilibrium paths are more likely to be considered misalignments by most
economic agents than relatively small deviations; cf. Taylor et al. (2001). In addition, a signiﬁcant
response to only particularly large misalignments of asset prices can help avoid excess interest rate
volatility, which may result if interest rates respond to every misalignment of asset prices.8
The non-linear simple interest rate rules are speciﬁed by assuming that ωa,ts are logistic func-
tions of the corresponding excess growth terms, represented by e a. Speciﬁcally,
ωa,t =





where γ is a positive scale parameter while a = e, ph, s and `. It follows that ωa,t −→ ωa if e a2
t is
suﬃciently large while ωa,t −→ 0 if e a2
t −→ 0; the speed of convergence will depend on γ. Hence,
the response to an asset price misalignment will increase with the size of the misalignment and
even be negligible if the misalignment is not suﬃciently large; see e.g. Ter¨ asvirta (1998) for details
on this class of non-linear functions.
In Subsection (3.3), we present results based on six special cases of (10). This facilitates under-
standing of the mechanisms that come into play when diﬀerent interest rate rules are implemented
while the degree of interest rate smoothing was found to be 0.7.
8One can alternatively specify a sign-dependent response to asset prices and let the central bank respond asym-
metrically to asset prices, e.g. neglect rising asset prices but become engaged when they start falling, especially when
such a fall is perceived as endangering ﬁnancial stability. However, such a response to asset price misalignments can
give rise to moral hazard and excessive risk-taking, because the central bank’s response could be interpreted as if it
would be oﬀering insurance against particularly large falls; see e.g. Roubini (2006) and Cecchetti et al. (2000).
10in the model. Our main analysis is presented in Section 4.
3.3 Performance of special interest rate rules
The six special interest rate rules are presented in Table 1. We let the Taylor rule, TR, be our
benchmark rule and deﬁne the other special cases of (10) by adding each of the remaining terms
in turn. For example, we deﬁne the smoothing rule, SM, by just adding the second term ωr(rt−1−
(¯ π + rr)) to the Taylor rule, while a rule with a response to house prices, PH, is deﬁned by (just)
adding ωph(∆4pht − µph) to the Taylor rule.
Table 1: Special cases of simple interest rate rules
Arguments: ∆4put ∆4yt rt−1 et ∆4pht ∆4st ∆4`t
Steady states: ¯ π µy ¯ π + rr e µph µs µ`
Steady-state values: 0.025 0.025 0.06 (p − p
∗)t 0.10 0.10 0.05
Rules: ωr ωπ ωy ωe ω` ωph ωs
Taylor TR 1.5 0.5
Smoothing SM 1.5 0.5 0.75
Exchange rate EX 1.5 0.5 0.33
House prices PH 1.5 0.5 0.20
Equity prices OSE 1.5 0.5 0.20
Credit growth CR 1.5 0.5 0.20
Note: rt = (¯ π + rr) + ωπ(∆4put − ¯ π) + ωy(∆4yt − µy) + ωr(rt−1 − (¯ π + rr))
+ωe(et − ¯ e) + ωph(∆4pht − µph) + ωs(∆4st − µs) +ω`(∆4`t − µ`)
The response coeﬃcients are set in the light of earlier studies within the context of diﬀerent
models and data sets. For the Taylor rule, we use the values of 1.5 and 0.5, respectively, for the
inﬂation gap and the output growth gap. These are kept unchanged when the remaining rules are
deﬁned by adding the diﬀerent terms. This helps to bring forward potential value added in terms
of improved macroeconomic performance through an additional response to e.g. asset prices. The
degree of interest rate smoothing (ωr) is set equal to 0.75, while the response coeﬃcient associated
with the exchange rate misalignment is set at 0.33 (as in Ball (1999b)). The response coeﬃcients
associated with house prices, equity prices and credit growth are set at 0.20 in the light of Chadha
et al. (2004) and our own analysis.
The performance of all rules is examined by measuring their performance in counterfactual
simulations of the model over the six-year period, 1995q1–2000q4; the conclusions have been found
to be robust to the choice of the simulation period.9
Table 2 summarizes the vast amount of information from the simulations. For each interest
rate rule, it records the standard deviations of key variables relative to those in the sample over
the simulation horizon. The following observations can be made from a glance at Table 2:
First, all of the rules contribute to lower variance in (underlying) inﬂation and output growth
relative to their observed variances over the simulation horizon. For example, under the Taylor rule
9In line with common practice, when undertaking counterfactual simulations, we assume that the model’s para-
meters are invariant to the speciﬁed changes in the interest rate rules. This assumption may be innocuous if the
Lucas critique is quantitatively not that important, especially in the face of marginal changes in monetary policy;
see e.g. Rudebusch (1995).
11Table 2: Performance of the special simple interest rate rules
Variables
Interest rate rules ∆4put ∆4yt ∆rt et ∆4pht ∆4st ∆4`t
Sample 1995:1-2000:4 sdev 0.005 0.023 0.007 0.017 0.040 0.232 0.023
Taylor TR Rel. sdev 0.85 0.81 1.92 1.36 1.19 0.77 1.00
Smoothing SM Rel. sdev 0.92 0.88 1.53
♠ 1.51 1.24 0.68 1.20
Exchange rate EX Rel. sdev 0.87 0.84 2.18 1.19
♠ 1.18 0.87 0.99
House prices PH Rel. sdev 0.80 0.81 1.78 1.32 0.98
♠ 0.77 0.89
♠
Equity prices OSE Rel. sdev 0.85 0.77
♠ 1.61 1.71 1.53 0.36
♠ 1.06
Credit growth CR Rel. sdev 0.78
♠ 0.80 1.94 1.38 1.17 0.72 0.93
Note: The symbol
♠ denotes the minimum value of the relative standard deviation (Rel. sdev) in a column.
The relative standard deviations are calculated relative to the standard deviation in the sample (sdev).
(TR), the standard deviations of these variables are 0.85 and 0.81, respectively, i.e. 15% and 19%,
lower than those in the sample. On the other hand, this relative stability seems to be achieved
at the expense of substantially higher volatility in interest rates, exchange rates and house prices.
The increased interest rate volatility reduces the volatility in equity prices relative to its observed
value (e.g. by about 23% in the case of TR).
Second, it appears that the volatility of a variable can be substantially reduced when the
interest rate rule allows a response to that variable, in addition to inﬂation and output growth.
We note that the relative standard deviations of interest rates, exchange rates, house prices and
equity prices attain their minimum values, under the rule with smoothing (SM), the exchange rate
(EX), house prices (PH) and equity prices (OSE), respectively. Credit growth also becomes more
stable in the credit growth rule (CR), but its relative standard deviation attains it minimum value
in the case of the house price rule (PH), reﬂecting the importance of house price growth for credit
growth. The low volatility of asset prices and credit growth itself contributes to stability in the
other variables, but makes interest rates more volatile.
Third, it appears that neither overly stable nor overly volatile interest rates promote economic
stability. We note that e.g. inﬂation and output growth are more volatile under the smoothing
rule (SM) and the exchange rate rule (EX) compared with the other rules considered. Under the
smoothing rule, interest rates become more stable than under the other rules considered. However,
their ability to stabilize the economy becomes severely limited. Moreover, there is in general a
trade-oﬀ between volatility in interest rates and credit growth. Thus, stabilization of interest rates
tends to raise the volatility of credit growth, which itself contributes to making other variables more
volatile, especially inﬂation and output. Under the exchange rate rule, the volatility of interest
rates is higher than under any of the other rules considered. Thus, inﬂation and output growth
become more volatile, despite a relatively more stable exchange rate.
Fourth, when the interest rate rule allows a response to house prices, equity prices or credit
growth, inﬂation and output growth become more stable than under the Taylor rule (TR), and
especially relative to the smoothing rule (SM). In particular, inﬂation is relatively more stable
12under the credit growth rule (CR), while output growth is more stable under the equity price
rule (OSE) than under the other rules considered. These ﬁndings can be explained with reference
to lags from interest rate changes to their eﬀects on output and inﬂation as well as from house
prices, equity prices and credit to output and inﬂation; see Section 2 on impulse responses. By
responding to excess growth in house prices, equity prices and credit, monetary policy gets a ”head
start” relative to the Taylor rule and becomes able to counteract the eﬀects of these asset prices
and credit on inﬂation and output almost when they are realized. In contrast, the Taylor rule
starts responding to asset prices and credit only when their eﬀects on inﬂation and output are
realized. Thus, because of lags from interest rate changes to output and inﬂation, it becomes less
eﬀective in stabilizing inﬂation and output.
However, a response to the nominal exchange rate turns out to make inﬂation and output
growth more volatile than under the Taylor rule. This is mainly because the exchange rate rule
contributes to making interest rates quite volatile, as noted above. In addition, a response to the
nominal exchange rate would be as if one raised the response coeﬃcients associated with excess
inﬂation and output growth. This is because the nominal exchange rate has stronger and immediate
eﬀects on inﬂation and output in contrast with those of the other asset prices and credit, as noted in
Section 2. Thus, in terms of stabilizing inﬂation and output, raising their own response coeﬃcients
would prove more eﬀective than by responding to the nominal exchange rate.
Finally, interest rates do not become more volatile (than under the Taylor rule) when they
respond to movements in house prices and equity prices. In the case of the credit growth rule,
their volatility increases only slightly relative to the Taylor rule. The explanation is that the
contributions of house prices, equity prices and credit growth to volatility in interest rates is
counteracted by the contributions of more stable inﬂation and output growth. Credit growth
becomes more volatile in the case of the equity price rule, but turns out to be especially low under
the house price rule, and under the credit growth rule.
Next, we examine the performance of special cases of the interest rate rule 10 when the response
coeﬃcients are selected among a large set of possible coeﬃcient values through model simulations.
4 Performance of eﬃcient interest rate rules
We have examined the performance of a large number of linear interest rate rules deﬁned by
varying the response coeﬃcients (ωs). Diﬀerent combinations of the response coeﬃcients within
plausible ranges were used to deﬁne an equally large number of interest rate rules, up to 57,000.
The steady-state values (µs) were kept ﬁxed at the same values as in Table 1. And as above, the
performance of all rules was recorded in counterfactual simulations of the model over the six-year
period, 1995q1–2000q4; see Appendix B for details.
13We will only present and focus on outcomes of a subset of the rules examined, namely those
of eﬃcient interest rate rules; cf. Ball (1999a). Such rules deﬁne eﬃciency frontiers that depict
trade-oﬀs between stability of inﬂation and output, also known as Taylor curves. Accordingly, it
should not be possible to reduce inﬂation volatility without inducing higher output volatility by













Figure 1: An eﬃciency frontier for eﬃcient interest rate rules without response to asset prices and
credit. Precisely, ”Taylor rule” indicates that the associated eﬃciency frontier is based on interest
rate rules that only allow a response to inﬂation, output growth and/or the lagged interest rate. The
response coeﬃcients deﬁning the rules are selected on the basis of 891 model simulations. sd(D4pu)
and sd(D4y) denote the standard deviations of the annual (underlying) inﬂation rate and that of
annual output growth, respectively.
Figures 1–3 present our benchmark results based on the eﬃcient rules speciﬁed as the Taylor
rule with smoothing (SM). Precisely, the interest rate rule allows only responses to inﬂation and
output growth and lagged interest rates, as in SM, except that values of the response coeﬃcients
ωπ, ωy and ωr are selected through model simulations.
Figure 1 presents the outcomes of model simulations under these rules in terms of an eﬃciency
frontier of inﬂation and output growth. This suggests a trade-oﬀ between stability in inﬂation
and output growth. A similar trade-oﬀ curve can be shown between stability in inﬂation and the
output gap, since output growth is closely related to the output gap in the model; cf. equation
(1). Each point on the eﬃciency frontier can be associated with a speciﬁc combination of the three
response coeﬃcients.10
Figures 2–3 depict the outcomes under the eﬃcient rules in terms of ﬁnancial stability at
10Conditional on a given speciﬁcation of the interest rate rule, the optimal values of the response coeﬃcients, and





















Figure 2: Financial stability curves based on diﬀerent ﬁnancial stability indicators: f1–f4. Where,
f1 = debt to income ratio; f2 = debt service to income ratio; f3 = the broad ﬁnancial stability
indicator; and f4 is f3 adjusted for direct interest rate eﬀects. The vertical axis measures the
standard deviations of the ﬁnancial stability indicators corresponding to diﬀerent levels of sd(D4y),
obtained under the eﬃcient interest rate rules speciﬁed as the Taylor rule (with smoothing); see
Figure 1. Financial stability and inﬂation and output growth volatility at e.g. points A and B are
the outcomes of the same Taylor rules; see Figure 1.
diﬀerent levels of output growth volatility, sd(D4y). Hereafter, we refer to these relationships as
”ﬁnancial stability curves”. For example, point A on the eﬃciency frontier for inﬂation and output
in Figure 1 and those on the ”ﬁnancial stability curves” in Figures 2–3 are the outcomes of the same
interest rate rule, deﬁned by a speciﬁc combination of the three response coeﬃcients. In Figure 2,
ﬁnancial stability is represented by the standard deviations of the debt to income ratio, f1, debt
service to income ratio, f2, the broad ﬁnancial fragility indicator of Eitrheim and Gulbrandsen
(2001), f3, and a version of f3 adjusted for direct interest rate eﬀects, f4. In Figure 3, ﬁnancial
stability is represented by the standard deviation of changes in the short-term interest rates and
an equally weighted sum of the standard deviations of the three asset prices; alternative weights
led to comparable results.
While there is a trade-oﬀ between stability in inﬂation and output under the (eﬃcient) Taylor
rules with smoothing, there seems to be a positive relationship between ﬁnancial stability and
output stability, except when output stability is relatively high; see Figures 2–3. In the latter case,
a reduction in output (growth) volatility (and simultaneously, an increase in inﬂation volatility)
has ambiguous eﬀects on ﬁnancial stability. We note that all indicators of ﬁnancial stability in
Figure 2 suggest an improvement, i.e. a reduction in the standard deviations of f1–f4, when
















Figure 3: Financial stability curves based on measures of volatility in asset prices and interest
rates. The vertical axis measures the standard deviations of these ﬁnancial stability indicators
corresponding to diﬀerent levels of sd(D4y), obtained under the eﬃcient interest rate rules speciﬁed
as the Taylor rule (with smoothing); see Figure 1. sd(D4ap) denotes an equally weighted sum of the
standard deviations of the three asset prices: house prices, equity prices and the nominal exchange
rate, while sd(Dr) denotes the standard deviation of quarterly changes in interest rates. Financial
stability and inﬂation and output growth volatility at e.g. points A and B are the outcomes of the
same Taylor rules; see Figures 1–2.
interest rate volatility decreases, however, at relatively low levels of output volatility; see Figure
3. This is mainly because the corresponding relatively high volatility in inﬂation induces high
volatility in nominal interest rates and thereby high volatility in asset prices. Figure 3 shows that
asset price volatility largely behaves as interest rate volatility at diﬀerent levels of output growth
volatility.
Below, we investigate whether an additional interest rate response to asset prices and credit
would reduce volatility of inﬂation, output and the ﬁnancial stability indicators. If there are such
gains, the eﬃciency frontiers should move inwards, while the ﬁnancial stability curves should move
downwards at the diﬀerent levels of output volatility, relative to the cases under the eﬃcient Taylor
rules with smoothing presented in Figures 1–3.
Figure 4 presents the eﬃciency frontiers associated with extended simple interest rate rules
that allow a response to asset prices and credit growth, in addition to inﬂation, output growth and
lagged interest rates. The solid crossed line represents the eﬃciency frontier associated with the
interest rate rules that allow a response to asset prices, inﬂation and output growth, but not to
credit growth. The boxed line represents the eﬃciency frontier when a response to credit growth is
also allowed. For comparison, we have also pasted in the eﬃciency frontier from Figure 1, circled
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Figure 4: Eﬃciency frontiers for (eﬃcient) interest rate rules without and with response to as-
set prices and credit. Solid circled line represents the outcomes under eﬃcient Taylor rule (with
smoothing), as in Figure 1. The solid line represents the outcomes under a nominal income (tar-
geting) rule. The solid crossed line represents the outcomes under eﬃcient Taylor rules that allow
response to the three asset prices: house prices, equity prices and nominal exchange rate. Finally,
the solid boxed line represents the outcomes under eﬃcient Taylor rules that allow response to
excess growth in the three asset prices and credit. The response coeﬃcients deﬁning each of the
rules are selected on the basis of about 57,000 model simulations.
addition, we have also pasted in a solid line representing an eﬃciency frontier based on simple
interest rate rules where the interest rate responds to nominal income growth and the real output
growth; cf. McCallum and Nelson (1999).
Figure 4 shows that allowance for additional responses to asset prices, i.e. house prices and
equity prices, and particularly credit growth, contributes to a shift in the eﬃciency frontier towards
origin, and hence provides lower variability in both inﬂation and output growth. In our simulations,
the response coeﬃcient of the exchange rate turned out to be zero, as a positive response tended
to increase the variability in both inﬂation and output and thus led to a shift outwards from the
origin. Thus, the diﬀerent points on the solid circled and boxed eﬃciency frontiers refer only to
diﬀerent combinations of response coeﬃcients for all the other variables except the exchange rate.11
It also appears that the performance of the nominal income targeting rule in terms of inﬂation and
output stability is inferior to that of the Taylor rule with smoothing, mainly because it behaves as
a restricted version of this rule. Thus, we leave it out in the further discussion.
The response to asset prices and credit growth has mixed eﬀects on ﬁnancial stability, however;
see Figures 5–6. When ﬁnancial stability is measured by volatility in the debt service to income
11The points where two of the eﬃciency frontiers merge with each other include combinations of weights where
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Figure 5: Financial stability curves based on debt to income ratio (f1) under eﬃcient Taylor rules
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Figure 6: Financial stability curves based on debt service to income ratio (f2) under eﬃcient Taylor
rules (with smoothing) and with additional allowance for a response to asset prices and credit; cf.
Figure 2.
ratio (f2) and the broad indicators (f3 and f4), the ﬁnancial stability curves move slightly upward,
relative to the benchmark cases based on eﬃcient Taylor rules (with smoothing), indicating a
deterioration in ﬁnancial stability at diﬀerent levels of output growth volatility; see e.g. Figure 5.
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Figure 7: Financial stability curves based on asset price volatility and interest rate volatility under
eﬃcient Taylor rules (with smoothing) and with additional allowance for a response to asset prices
and credit; see Figure 3 for details.
stabilize these variables, but at the expense of relatively higher interest rate volatility. This eﬀect
dominates the eﬀect on the debt service to income ratio of relatively more stable credit growth,
inﬂation and output growth. Consequently, ﬁnancial stability indicators depending directly on
interest rate movements tend to display more variation than in the other cases. However, ﬁnancial
stability improves when measured by volatility in the debt to income ratio and asset prices. We
note that the corresponding ﬁnancial stability curves shift downwards at the diﬀerent level of
output growth volatility; see Figures 6–7.
4.1 Sensitivity analyses
We have undertaken a number of sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of our results
regarding gains from responding to asset prices and/or credit. We obtained results comparable to
those presented in Figures 4–7 when we altered the interest rate rule (10) in the following ways
and undertook simulations to derive eﬃciency frontiers and ﬁnancial stability curves.12
In the ﬁrst (sensitivity) analysis, we replaced the underlying inﬂation rate (∆4pu) in the diﬀerent
rules with the inﬂation rate (∆4p), and obtained comparable results.
In the second analysis, we replaced the excess output growth term, (∆4y −µy), in the rules with
the error-correction term in the aggregate demand equation, (1), representing deviation from trend
output, without observing much diﬀerence in the results. We have also examined the sensitivity of
the results by replacing the excess output growth term with an unemployment gap term deﬁned
12The results are available upon request to the authors.
19as deviation between actual and equilibrium unemployment rate set at 4%; A change of this to 3%
or 5% did not alter the ranking of the rules in terms of their stabilization properties.
In the third analysis, we checked the sensitivity of our results to several alternative values for
the steady-state values of the growth terms (µs). We observed gains from responding to asset
prices and credit in most of the cases except when the steady-state values were set at particularly
high values relative to the corresponding in-sample estimates of their mean values, as presented
in Table 1. In such cases, monetary policy responded to the growth in house prices, equity prices
and credit by lowering interest rates and thereby fueled their growth in most of the simulation
period. In these exercises, the steady-state growth value of house prices (µph) was shifted in the
range 7–13%, that of equity prices (µs) was shifted in the range -10%–30%, while that of credit
growth (µ`) was changed in the range 5–10%. We also let the steady-state value of output growth
(µy) take on diﬀerent values within the range 1.5–4%.
In the fourth analysis, we investigated the sensitivity of our conclusions to allowance for a
size-dependent response to excess growth in asset prices and credit. Such a response was modeled
by letting their response coeﬃcients in the interest rate rule be zero unless excess growth in house
prices, equity prices and credit moved outside the ranges speciﬁed above (in the third sensitivity
analysis); see equation (11). Values of the response coeﬃcients when asset prices and credit moved
outside the ranges were determined by model simulations such that they deﬁned eﬃciency frontiers.
The steady-state values (µs) were maintained at their reference values provided in Table 1, while
γ was set at a large value to obtain (almost) no response to excess growth within the speciﬁed
ranges.
The eﬃciency curves under such non-linear rules also suggested gains from responding to asset
prices and credit in terms of inﬂation and output stability, but mixed eﬀects on ﬁnancial stability,
as above. As one would expect, the relevant curves were found to lie between those of the Taylor
rule and the (linear) rules extended with asset prices and credit in Figures 4–7. This is because,
for movements close to the steady-state values, the interest rate response to excess growth in asset
prices and credit was quite weak and hence the outcomes of the rules were close to those of the
Taylor rule. In the case of particularly large growth in asset prices and/or credit, however, the
interest rate response was close to that in the linear rules with asset prices and credit. Given that
the non-linear rules responded to fewer misalignments, the performance of such rules in terms of
the eﬃciency curves was found to be inferior to that of the corresponding linear rule, but superior
to that of the Taylor rule.
Finally, it is comforting that our conclusions seem fairly robust to model choice. A number of
recent studies have obtained comparable results regarding gains from responding to asset prices and
credit using alternative empirical models for other countries. This is in contrast with e.g. Bernanke
and Gertler (1999) who reported no gains from responding to equity prices within the context of a
20closed economy model. In particular, Cecchetti et al. (2000), contradicting this ﬁnding, point out
gains from responding to misalignments in asset prices within the context of a comparable closed
economy model. Romaniuk (2006) using a small reduced form model of the US economy also ﬁnds
signiﬁcant gains from responding to equity prices. Also, Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2005) using a
small rational expectation model for the UK point out gains from responding to house prices and
equity prices.
5 Conclusions
Our results suggest that monetary policy faces a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output stability,
while ﬁnancial stability can be improved together with output stability, unless the latter is pushed
towards relatively high levels. At such levels, inﬂation becomes quite volatile leading to high
interest rate volatility, making ﬁnancial stability decrease when measured by interest rate-sensitive
indicators of ﬁnancial stability, especially asset prices (including the nominal exchange rate).
We also ﬁnd that an additional interest rate response to excess growth in house prices, eq-
uity prices and credit raises stability in inﬂation and output. Such a response has mixed eﬀects
on ﬁnancial stability, however. Financial stability indicators that are directly aﬀected by these
variables such as volatility in asset prices and the debt to income ratio tend to suggest higher
ﬁnancial stability at diﬀerent levels of output stability. However, the additional response to excess
growth in house prices, equity prices and credit contributes to relatively high interest rate volatility.
Thus, particularly interest rate-sensitive indicators of ﬁnancial stability, such as the debt service
to income ratio, tend to suggest lower ﬁnancial stability at diﬀerent levels of output volatility.
However, when interest rates respond to a misalignment in the nominal exchange rate, the
increased interest rates volatility outweighs the stabilizing eﬀect of the exchange rate on inﬂation
and output. Thus, through an additional response to the exchange rate misalignment, inﬂation
and output turn out to be less stable than when interest rates only respond to inﬂation and output
gaps and lagged interest rates.
Our results have appeared quite robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the interest rate rule,
use of alternative indicators for terms entering the interest rate rules, and alternative values for
key parameters representing steady-state values of growth in asset prices and credit. In addition,
we have obtained comparable results using several alternative indicators of output stability and
ﬁnancial stability. Some recent studies using alternative models for other countries also support
our ﬁndings.
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A Appendix: Data deﬁnitions
The econometric model is based on seasonally unadjusted quarterly data. All time series have
been extracted from the RIMINI database of Norges Bank. Below, for each of the time series, the
corresponding name in the database is given in square brackets.
E Eﬀective import-weighted value of NOK; 1991 = 1. [CPIVAL].
H Standard working hours per week. [NH]
L Nominal credit volume. Mill. NOK. [K1M]. ` is log of nominal credit volume. L is a domestic
credit indicator, including loans to the non-ﬁnancial private sector and municipalities from all
domestic ﬁnancial institutions as well as bonds and loan certiﬁcates issued by some sectors.
OILP Brent Blend crude oil prices per barrel in USD. [SPOILUSD].
P Norwegian Consumer Price Index. [CPI].
P∗ Index for consumer prices in Norway’s trading partners in foreign currency. [PCKONK].
PH Index for house prices in Norway. [PH].
PR Mainland economy value added per man-hour at factor costs, ﬁxed base year (1991) prices.
Mill. NOK. [ZYF].
PU Underlying consumer price index: CPI adjusted for indirect taxes, electricity and fuel prices.
[KPIJAE].
r Euro-krone nominal interest rate with 3-month maturity. [RS].
24S Stock Price Index for Oslo Stock Exchange. [OSE].
S∗ Morgan Stanley World Index (MSCI).
U Unemployment rate. [UR2].
W Hourly wages in mainland Norway.
Y Total value added at market prices in the mainland economy. Fixed base year (1991) prices.
Mill. NOK. [YF].
B Appendix: Model simulations
To obtain the results in Table 2, we implemented the diﬀerent rules as speciﬁed in Table 1 in the
complete macroeconometric model, as presented in Akram and Eitrheim (2006). The model was
then simulated over the six-year period: 1995q1–2000q4. We have checked the sensitivity of our
conclusions by selecting diﬀerent periods for the counterfactual simulations, in which the economy
experienced diﬀerent disturbances. Our main conclusions appeared robust to the choice of the
simulation period, mainly because the model is linear.
The eﬃciency frontiers presented in Figure 1 have been obtained by implementing interest
rate rules whose response coeﬃcients ωs were selected through a grid search over diﬀerent ranges.
Speciﬁcally, we let each of the response coeﬃcients for the three coeﬃcients ωπ, ωy and ωr take on
(positive) values within reasonable ranges. The number of possible combinations of the coeﬃcient
values in this case was 891, deﬁning an equally number of possible simple interest rate rules with
three terms. The model was then simulated over the same six-year period, as above. The outcome
of each simulation in terms of standard deviations of inﬂation and output growth, calculated
over the simulation period, was thereafter depicted in a two-dimensional diagram, with standard
deviations of the inﬂation gap and the output growth gap on the axes, each of the simulations
resulting in a single point in the diagram. The 891 points were then enveloped from below to
deﬁne the eﬃciency frontiers; see e.g. McCaw and Morka (2004).
The ﬁnancial stability curves in Figures 2–3 have been obtained by depicting the standard
deviations of output growth against the standard deviations of the diﬀerent ﬁnancial stability
indicators under the rules (or combinations of response coeﬃcients) deﬁning the eﬃciency frontier
in Figure 1.
The eﬃciency frontiers in Figure 4 were derived as in Figure 1. Speciﬁcally, for interest rate
rule with response to asset prices, we implemented 57,024 possible combinations of the six response
coeﬃcients ωπ, ωy, ωr, ωph, ωs, and ωe, deﬁning an equal number of possible simple interest rate
rules. Given that none of the combinations of the response coeﬃcients deﬁning the corresponding
eﬃciency frontier included value of ωe > 0, we set ωe = 0 when implementing interest rate rule with
25response to asset prices and credit. In this case, we also implemented 57,024 possible combinations
of the six response coeﬃcients ωπ, ωy, ωr, ωph, ωs, and ω`. In the case of the nominal income
rule, we imposed the restriction ωπ= ωy and added an additional output-gap term, deﬁned by
the equilibrium correction term in the aggregate demand equation as precisely deﬁned in the
complete model, to the interest rate rule (10). Thus, to deﬁne the eﬃciency frontier under the
nominal income rule, we implemented 891 diﬀerent combinations of the three coeﬃcients ωπ, ωr
and ωoutput gap.
The ﬁnancial stability curves in Figures 5–7 were derived as in Figures 2–3.
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